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ABSTRACT 
Tyler Williams: LET’S GET TO WORK! EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (VET) IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND 
FRANCE 
(Under the Direction of John D. Stephens) 
 What defines an effective Vocational Education and Training (VET) system? Some vari-
ables I analyze are commodification of education, educational stratification, and public commit-
ment to VET, measuring to what extent each influences youth unemployment and income in-
equality. Using a three country cluster framework, I find that highly commodified, highly strati-
fied VET systems are strongly associated with lower youth unemployment while VET systems 
with low levels of commodification and stratification are weakly associated with lower income 
inequality, provided they have a strong public commitment to VET. These findings are useful 
insofar as policy makers understand the tradeoffs between the variables and the corresponding 
consequences they bring to the labor market. 
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Introduction  
 Over the past half century, vocational education training (VET) programs have become 
more academic in nature (Smeby, 2015). Certain professions - namely teaching, nursing, and so-
cial work - were upgraded to higher education in response to strong student growth and demand 
for skilled labor in the 1960s. Prioritizing theory and research above field experience and clinical 
practice, “academic drift” is a term often used to describe the institutionalization of workforce 
preparation programs within the confines of colleges and universities. Although many use this 
term critically, Winch (2010) argues conceptual understanding of vocation elevates skill and task 
to competence and occupation. Only then can one achieve a degree of mastery over practical 
knowledge, thereby increasing earning potential and labor market mobility. Numerous typologies 
of VET systems have evolved in conjunction with this debate, shaped by differing philosophical, 
cultural, and economic impressions of skill formation. The self-evident research question that 
emerges is as follows: what type of VET system best prepares students for work?  
 To answer this question, I will first identify the three welfare-state regimes noted by Esp-
ing-Andersen (1990) and the principles defining them, followed by an analysis of the political 
forces shaping their evolution. Next, I will outline the corresponding three VET systems devel-
oped by Busemeyer (2015), the theory underpinning each, and the parties responsible for the ex-
isting clusters. Unpacking this research question further, I will qualify the statement “best pre-
pares students for work” into a set of variables to be tested against each system of VET. In the 
interest of precision, I will choose one representative country from each cluster to examine  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through case studies, whereby the legislative history, institutional structure, and clarifying objec-
tives of each country’s VET system will be presented. From here, I will conduct a comparative 
analysis of these case studies with the aforementioned metrics in mind, searching for confirma-
tion or rejection of the stated hypothesis. Finally, I will offer concluding remarks based upon the 
findings from the previous section. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 Before a conceptual understanding of welfare state regimes can be achieved, one must 
become familiar with the principles differentiating each cluster. De-commodification, in its sim-
plest form, can be defined as the degree to which one can maintain a livelihood without reliance 
on the market. Without doubt, this strengthens the position of the employee relative to the em-
ployer, which is why employers have historically opposed this process. De-commodification al-
lows employees to opt out of work for whatever reason whenever they consider it necessary. 
Childbirth, illness, and holiday come to mind but do not complete an exhaustive list of reasons 
employees may take leave. The welfare states of North America and Europe have engaged in de-
commodification to varying degrees with varying amounts of resistance or support from the 
middle classes, who have been decisive in consolidating the social safety net post World War II.  
 In and of itself, the presence of a welfare state is not sufficient to correct societal inequal-
ities. Esping-Andersen argues within many welfare states, a system of stratification exists to ac-
tively enforce the order of social relations. Means-tested government programs, for example, 
have resulted in the widespread stigmatization of recipients, further ostracizing this group from 
the rest of society. A universalist system, by contrast, fosters inclusivity and cross-class solidari-
ty, reducing the stratification seen in means-tested models. Stratification exists in various exten-
sions of the welfare state, most notably in education and healthcare. While many other factors 
went into consideration in the categorization of contemporary welfare states, de-commodifica-
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tion and stratification are the defining principles necessary to understand Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) model. 
 The first cluster, known as “liberal” welfare states, offer means-tested assistance and 
modest social insurance coupled with a liberal market economy. This reduces de-commodifica-
tion and social rights while enforcing stratification along class lines. The United States is the 
most prominent of a liberal welfare state, which also includes Australia and Canada. In the sec-
ond cluster, we find the “conservative” welfare states, concentrated in continental Europe. In-
cluding but not limited to Germany, Austria, and Italy, conservative welfare states are built upon 
a strong Christian-Democratic tradition, taking a corporatist approach to the market where bene-
fits encourage motherhood and exclude non-working wives. The final cluster, known as “social 
democratic” welfare states, operate on the principles of social rights, de-commodification, and 
universalism. Located mostly in the Nordic region, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are prom-
inent examples of the equality-centered social democratic welfare state. What caused the con-
struction of separate welfare states on a geographically confined continent? Political leanings, of 
course, of the newly powerful white-collar middle classes. 
 In the liberal anglosphere, the middle class’ livelihood  was derived from the market, not 
the state, rendering the stratified social support services exclusively to the poor. With few bene-
fits aside from private insurance to fringes of the middle class, they voted their interest, main-
taining a liberal market economy with federal aid for those who qualify. This extended to the ed-
ucation system, where public spending on pre-school, primary school, and day care are limited 
(Iversen and Stephens, 2008). The bulk of government expenditure in liberal market economies 
is on college prep, public community colleges, and public universities. Center-right parties are 
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careful not to spend too much money on higher education, as some upper-middle and upper class 
voters pay privately for secondary and tertiary education for their children. Middle class loyalties 
in conservative continental European welfare states remain tethered to occupationally segregated 
social insurance programs and the Christian Democratic values behind those who supported them 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).  Because Christian Democratic parties cultivate cross-class coalitions, 
they maintain their power by forming governments with other centrist, middle class parties, of-
tentimes the social democrats. These parties continue to support a coordinated market economy 
and a highly effective specific skills training system that eases the transition form education to 
the labor market (Iversen and Stephens, 2008). Finally, in social democratic welfare states, the 
social policies are directly tied to middle class sensibilities, including universal social rights (Es-
ping-Andersen, 1990). In these countries, center-left parties strongly support investment in pre-
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school, primary school, secondary school, day care, and active labor market programs. Thus, a 
“flexicurity” model emerges in many social democratic states, namely Denmark and the Nether-
lands, representing a center-left coalition of low and high skilled laborers who benefit from these 
programs (Iversen and Stephens, 2008).  
 Citing Esping-Andersen’s work, Busemeyer (2015) identified de-commodification and 
stratification as two key dimensions along which VET systems, in addition to welfare regimes, 
vary. When graphing these two variables, educational stratification along the x axis and com-
modification of education along the y axis as seen below in Figure 1.1, no apparent association 
among countries can be observed.  
What does emerge, however, are three distinct groupings of countries into clusters, mirroring the 
three worlds of welfare capitalism. The first grouping, known as the “liberal skill” cluster, com-
bines low levels of de-commodification, measured by high shares of private spending in educa-
tion from firms and individuals, with low levels of stratification. These countries - USA, Aus-
tralia, Canada - are largely the same countries seen in the liberal welfare state model. The next 
grouping is called the “collective skill” countries, where medium levels of de-commodification 
meet high levels of stratification. Several continental European countries can be found within 
this group, including but not limited to Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The final grouping 
are the “statist skill” countries, representing high levels of de-commodification with low levels of 
stratification. This cluster contains all the Nordic countries but also France, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland. 
 Interestingly, Powell et al. (2012) cited Greinert’s 2005 typology of “three classical mod-
els in European VET,” which closely resembles Busemeyer’s work. Greinart’s first system was 
!6
the “liberal market economy model (UK),” characterized by powerful universities which sit atop 
the educational hierarchy and often require extensive private financing to attend. The “dual cor-
poratist model (Germany)” came next, where coordination among state employees, labor union 
representatives, and private firms resulted in an autonomous system of youth vocational training. 
The final grouping was the “state regulated bureaucratic model (France),” defined by a strong 
centralization in planning, regulation, and financing by the state. Powell et al. see evidence of a 
creeping “neo-liberal market model” in dual corporatist countries, and to a lesser extent state 
regulated bureaucratic models, that threaten traditional models of coordinated vocational train-
ing. Some argue this is the result of the Europeanization of education systems through the 
Bologna (Higher Education) and Copenhagen (Vocational Education) processes, yet others argue 
each country’s respective education system reflect the institutionalization of values, which can-
not quickly be undone. 
 Competing theories of education indicate the degree to which school itself is de-commod-
ified. T.H. Marshall considered education to be a social right, writing that it is the state’s respon-
sibility to ensure each adult has received the requisite education to become a fully functional cit-
izen (Busemeyer, 2015, p30). Article 26 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) goes further, proclaiming education should develop the human personality, promote toler-
ance, and maintain peace. Under this school of thought, education is so much more than work-
force preparation; it is a tool to transform the human condition. Not surprisingly, social democra-
tic welfare states and statist skill VET systems subscribe to this theory, with Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden possessing the most de-commodified education system followed by Italy, France, 
and the Netherlands.  
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 Human capital theory, on the other hand, states an individual’s investment in education is 
a calculated cost-benefit analysis of tuition and opportunity cost vis-à-vis earnings potential and 
labor market mobility (Busemeyer, 2015). In the 1990s, human capital theory was fused with ra-
tional choice theory to examine the individual as a unique actor, not just part of a larger econom-
ic model, with agency regarding his or her career choices (Gillies, 2011). Private costs have been 
shown to shift individuals away from viewing education as a social right towards human capital 
theory, effectively commodifying the institutions of school. Countries high on commodification 
of education include the liberal skill cluster, where college and university funding is mostly the 
responsible of the private individual, followed by the collective skill cluster, whose VET funding 
is mostly derived from private firms, and finally the statist skill cluster, with most education 
funding coming from the government (Busemeyer, 2015). 
 While commodification of education versus educational stratification is a useful tool for 
understanding varieties of VET, there is a third key variable missing from this framework that 
helps qualify commodification of education - public commitment to VET. Liberal skill and col-
lective skill countries, for example, both commodify education more than statist skill countries, 
but they do so differently. By shifting the cost of education onto the private individual, the liberal 
skill cluster effectively reduces market, and therefore public, commitment to VET. The collective 
skill cluster, conversely, maintains high public commitment to VET through a coordinated mar-
ket economy with private firms sponsoring apprentices and state actors moderating. These con-
flicting traditions are legacies of opposing ideologies, even if both have their roots on the right. 
Secular conservative thought, found in liberal skill countries like the United States, feature low 
educational stratification and flexible labor markets, meaning students are encouraged to attend 
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university, borrowing money if need be, and find work after. Christian Democracy is rooted in 
Catholicism, which acknowledges both the volatility of markets and inefficiencies of govern-
ment, to offer a third way. The state as mediator and proponent of supportive institutional in-
frastructure facilitates a benevolent corporatist approach, which values the input of firms as 
providers of VET and youth as consumers (Busemeyer and Schlicht-Schmälzle, 2014). Keeping 
this third variable in mind, a clearer picture surfaces regarding the positive and negative conse-
quences each VET cluster has on its society. 
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Hypotheses 
 Given the commodification of education vs educational stratification framework estab-
lished in the previous section, the research question “what type of VET best prepares students for 
work?” may not be the best way to approach finding a precise answer. Instead, I can predict 
trends in labor market indicators based upon the degree of commodification of education and ed-
ucational stratification within VET systems. Before I do this, I must ask the question which labor 
market indicators most accurately depict the degree to which students are prepared for work? I 
can start with the word “work,” which implies some type of gainful employment. The economic 
indicator most widely used to measure how many young people are working is youth unem-
ployment, which has become a problem in many European countries in recent years. Still, youth 
unemployment does not tell you everything you need to know about how young people are far-
ing in the labor market. Are they working jobs that require skilled or unskilled labor? What are 
their prospects promotion or enrollment in continuing education or higher education programs? 
Are they satisfied with their work? Obviously, there is no one labor market indicator that answers 
all of these questions, but there is a metric of economic health that politicians from Bernie 
Sanders to Jeremy Corbyn have built their careers around addressing - income inequality. Mea-
sured by the gini index, income inequality shows how compressed incomes are in the earnings 
distribution, which often reveals how equal a society’s workforce is. Low levels of income in-
equality offers no guarantee that the overall economy is robust, merely that those at the bottom of 
the skills distribution are not unfairly surpassed by those at the top. For this reason, I have cho-
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sen income inequality as a gauge of whether a country’s VET can catapult its students and work-
ers into the middle class. 
 On the far end of the x and y axes of the VET typology graph, we have high levels of 
commodification of education and educational stratification, which no cluster represents but lib-
eral skill and collective skill regimes are nearby on the y and x axis respectively. On the other 
end of the graph, near zero, we have low levels of commodification and low levels of educational 
stratification, not far from the statist skill cluster with Finland closet in proximity. Understanding 
that higher levels of commodification of education means more private investment, either from 
individuals or firms depending on the country, and that higher levels of educational stratification 
equals more tracking and less educational equality, I can use theory and politics to hypothesize 
how these two variables impact youth unemployment and income inequality. High levels of 
commodification and high levels of educational stratification, influenced by human capital theo-
ry and advanced by Christian Democratic right wing parties, leads to low levels of youth unem-
ployment. Similarly, low levels of commodification and low levels of educational stratification, 
influenced by education as a social right and advanced by Social Democratic left wing parties, 
leads to low levels of income inequality. Both hypotheses are dependent on the assumption that 
there are high levels of public commitment to VET in the country studied. In the next section, I 
will choose three case studies to outline the history, structure, and objectives of each country’s 
VET system to present all the facts before evaluating the merit of the hypothesis just proposed. 
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Case Studies 
 Case studies are an effective tool to observe systemic trends playing out on a national 
level. A representative case study should not only be a member of the cluster in question, but 
ideally the highest profile country within the respective typology to maximize the available liter-
ature for consultation. Amongst the liberal skill cluster, I have chosen the country of my birth, 
the United States of America (USA), for further study. A country of over three hundred million, 
the USA is perhaps the most extreme example of a highly commodified economy where small 
changes in VET can make a big difference in the market. Next, I have chosen Germany to repre-
sent the collective skill cluster. With a much studied apprenticeship system dating back to the 
middle ages, Germany has stuck to tradition much more so than its neighbors to the west, show-
ing us that new is not always better when it comes to workforce preparation. Finally, I have cho-
sen France, the country of my study abroad, to embody the statist skill cluster. Of course, the 
Nordic countries also belong to this grouping, but the statist skill cluster is not the same as the 
social democratic welfare regimes, so I found France to be a compelling choice to represent the 
expansion in Busemeyer’s VET framework. 
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United States of America (USA) 
 Like in Germany, the USA’s early VET can be traced back to colonial times, where local 
artisans or craftspersons offered apprenticeships to delinquent or orphaned youth. What this 
arrangement lacked in formal, academic training it made up for with specialized vocational 
skills, which suited youth well in a time of steady work and little technological change. Moving 
forward to the time of the Civil War, the Morrill Acts of 1862 and again of 1890 established land 
grant colleges to train newly freed slaves in a vocation of their choosing. (Kim, Rojewski, and 
Henrickson, 2004). In addition to these colleges, the push for community college took center 
stage in 1900 when William Rainey, president of the University of Chicago, called for diversifi-
cation of higher education, saying, “many students who might not have the courage to enter upon 
a course of four years’ study would be willing to do the two years of work before entering busi-
ness or the professional school” (Cohen and Brawer, 2008). Rainey would soon get his wish with 
the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917, establishing secondary school career and technical 
education (CTE) with programs in agriculture, home economics, and the trades. By 1919, the 
number of community colleges had jumped from just 20 in 1909 to 170 a decade later (Kim, Ro-
jewski, and Henrickson, 2004). Throughout the 1920s, community colleges continued to grow 
with vocational education taking center stage at early meetings of the American Association for 
Junior Colleges (AAJC), now the American Association for Community Colleges (AACC). By 
the end of the decade, 440 community colleges enrolled 70,000 students nationwide (Cohen and 
Brawer, 2008). Legislation in 1937 brought American VET back to its roots, as the Fitzgerald 
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Act established the legislative framework for European style apprenticeships under the newly 
created Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training within the Department of Labor (Barabasch and 
Watt-Malcolm, 2012). This coupled nicely with the 70% of community college students focusing 
on the trades in 1940, even if community college students only accounted for 25% of all higher 
education students in 1950 due to lack of prestige (Cohen and Brawer, 2008). 
 After World War II, the Vocational Education Act of 1963 was the most influential leg-
islative reform of the era, aimed at expanding the size and scope of VET for economically disad-
vantaged populations (Kim, Rojewski, and Henrickson, 2004). As part of this legislation, Oppor-
tunity Industrialization Centers were opened in 1964, offering free training in vocational skills to 
under serviced communities (Shackleton, 1995). Communities colleges were also expanded and 
made more accessible to the working poor. Programs such as the Comprehensive Training and 
Employment Administration (1973), Job Training and Partnership Act (1982), and Carl D. 
Perkins Vocational Education Act (1984) offered additional federal funding for this cause (Cohen 
and Brawer, 2008). Although the Comprehensive Training and Employment Administration 
(CTEA) provided aid to nearly three million people, its eight billion dollar annual budget was 
scaled back in favor of the more modest Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA). The Reagan 
Administration felt CTEA was too centralized and too vast, leading to accusations that the JTPA 
engaged in “creaming” or only selecting trainees already likely to succeed. Some evidence has 
corroborated this criticism, as a 1993 study found JTPA’s 71% placement success rate dropped to 
62% when participants were randomly selected (Shackleton, 1995). Regarding the Perkins legis-
lation, a national study found more than 50% of community college students enrolled in VET 
were from disadvantaged backgrounds. Over this same time period (1973-1984), the share of 
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community college students choosing VET over liberal arts rose from 52% in 1973 to 72% in 
1984, only to drop again to 54% in 2004 as a result of the four year university for all push 
worldwide (Cohen and Brawer, 2008).  
 Where does VET stand today in the USA? After a foundation of elementary and middle 
school, which is compulsory, students enroll in high school. While most American high schools 
have a generalized curriculum with “core” classes, some vocational options, called career and 
technical education (CTE), are available. In 1987, 20% of students were enrolled in CTE classes, 
ranging from generalized courses like typing, business, or crafts to specific ones like computer 
programming, motor mechanics, and nursing. Since the Commission on Workforce Quality and 
Labor Market Efficiency revealed in 1989 that twenty to forty million Americans lack basic liter-
acy and analytical skills (Shackleton, 1995), American public schools have shifted focus to in-
creasing reading and mathematics proficiency, causing  the number of CTE credits earned by 
American high school students to drop by 14% in the following two decades. In recent years, 
however, CTE has seen a resurgence with more research on the connection between education 
and labor market. In 2015 alone, 39 states adopted 125 new policies increasing funding for CTE 
programs (Jacob, 2017). For students who do not pursue education beyond high school, earnings 
are slightly higher for those who take vocational coursework as opposed to those only enrolled in 
generalized classes. 
 If students do wish to complete postsecondary education, many paths are available in the 
USA, including apprenticeship programs, two-year public community colleges, two-year private 
for-profit trade schools, four-year public and private not-for-profit universities, and four-year 
private for-profit universities. Of these options, public two and four-year institutions as well as 
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private four-year not-for-profit universities consist of 90% of student enrollment. There is a 
strong correlation between increased education levels and increased mean income in the USA, 
with High School or GED earning $28, 335, some college earning $35,003, Associate Degrees 
earning $37, 954, and Bachelors Degrees earning $62,594 (Bailey and Berg, 2010). Because of 
this, many community college students enrolled in vocational coursework intent to transfer to 
four-year universities, with 5% doing so in Illinois, 12% in Florida, 16% in South Carolina, 27% 
in Maryland, and 30% in North Carolina (Cohen and Brawer, 2008). Not everyone taking com-
munity college classes, unfortunately, is successful in meeting their educational goals. Eight 
years after initial enrollment in community college, 6% of students have earned a certificate, 
16% have earned an associate’s degree, 18% have transferred and earned a bachelor’s degree, 
11% have transferred without earning a bachelor’s degree, and 49% have neither transferred nor 
earned an associate’s degree (Bailey and Berg, 2010). Even for this 60% of students who start 
community college classes but do not finish, they earn on average 9-13% more annually than the 
average high school degree or GED holder. Additionally, a sizable majority of this group self-re-
ported dropping out because they received all the training they needed to find employment, not 
because they were dissatisfied with the program. The survey data backs this up, as 80-90% of 
community college students were satisfied with their coursework and 90% of employers were 
satisfied with the quality of the training provided to their community college trained employees 
(Cohen and Brawer, 2008). The main factors contributing to North Carolina’s community college 
success, as reported by Raivio (2012), are open access policy, low tuition, broad geographic cov-
erage, participation of local communities, and state funding and oversight. Unlike many Eu-
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ropean VET systems, community colleges contribute towards local economic development with 
initial VET and continuing VET, filling the hole in skills development left by universities. 
 Although many four-year universities have a heavy liberal arts focus, Bailey and Berg 
(2010) contend many undergraduate majors act as funnels to specialized professional schools: 
biology to medical school, economics to business school, and political science to law school. If 
university students do not plan on attending graduate school, securing an internship, a sort of 
white collar apprenticeship, is becoming necessary for finding employment. Regarding actual 
apprenticeships, an estimated 490,000 were registered in 2003, up from 283,000 in 1990 
(Marschall, 2012). Resulting in part from Bill Clinton’s effort to connect schools to labor mar-
kets, the Administration spent 1.2 billion dollars during the 1990s on this cause, pushing em-
ployers to get more involved in the formal provision of skills. A formal apprenticeship lasts three 
to four years with at least two thousands hours of on-the-job training and one-hundred fifty hours 
of off-the-job training. Frequently arranged by unions, the quality of these apprenticeships are 
high but the quantity is low, even after the Clinton surge (Shackleton, 1995). Furthermore, many 
of these trainees are postsecondary degree holders in their mid-to-late twenties, meaning those 
already competitive in a liberal market economy get an extra leg up under this system. While the 
apprenticeship system has shown much promise to help those in the bottom half of the skills dis-
tribution in Germany, its American counterpart is smaller and scope and tends to cream top talent 
while ignoring high school and college dropouts desperately in need of skills (Bailey and Berg, 
2010). 
 The American VET system is very much a product of its liberal market economy, con-
forming to an individualistic pursuit of work (Marschall, 2012). Lacking the institutional ties 
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from school to work, American young adults rarely experience this transition in one step; instead, 
taking a messier approach to finding one’s vocation. According to the National Longitudinal 
Study of Youth, young men held an average of 4.0 jobs from 18-21 and 3.2 jobs from 22 to 25 
while young women held an average of 4.2 jobs from 18-21 and 3.2 jobs from 22 to 25 
(Schührer, Bills, and Weiss, 2015). I, myself, held two jobs from 18-21 and two jobs from 22-25 
in addition to full-time school and several unpaid internships. In the context of macroeconomic 
trends, the United States has one of the highest levels of job mobility in the OECD, with only 
35% of male workers in their late thirties having worked their current job for more than ten years 
compared to 58% in Germany (Shackleton, 1995). Therefore, the acquisition of general knowl-
edge, vocational or otherwise, in high school, community college, or university would broaden 
one’s options for work. Undertaking a highly-specific niche skill could prove to be a risky en-
deavor when employers have more liberty to hire and fire in the United States than across the 
Atlantic.  
 Let us not forget that liberal skill regimes like the USA prize four-year universities above 
all, both in terms of prestige and preparation (Bailey and Berg, 2010). The current policy is to 
prepare all students to attend a four-year university, with two-year community colleges offering 
those that fell through the cracks a “second chance” (Raivio, 2012). While those intentions are 
good, only 34% of young adults aged 25-29 have bachelor’s degrees in America, meaning the 
VET system exists to provide 66% of American adults a “second chance.” Moreover, what per-
centage of that 66% could have finished their bachelor’s degree had tuition, for which students 
must pay out of pocket or take out student loans for, not been so costly? For those who prefer 
work to school, a small yet efficacious creamed apprenticeship system exists, unfortunately ben-
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efiting those who have already acquired skills from school. Continuing education programs for 
low skilled Americans include Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Job Corps, Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance have been implemented with varying degrees of success (Shackleton, 1995). 
Overall, the USA VET system is mostly concentrated in schools - some in high school, some in 
trade school, most in community colleges - as a tool to enhance the job prospects of the individ-
ual in America’s competitive labor market. Even to this day, the American labor market is boom 
or bust with big time winners and big time losers, and VET is one of many instruments available 
for young people to achieve the “American Dream.” 
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Germany 
 Apprenticeships coordinated by guilds and chambers of commerce was an important part 
of the historical German economy. In the modern era, the government reinforced its commitment 
to this system by passing the “Handwerkerschutzgesetz,” or Law for the Protection of Manuel 
Tradesmen, in 1897. Under this legislation, the privileged position of the craft sector to observe, 
regulate, and run apprenticeship training was solidified (Busemeyer, 2015). Between 1885 and 
1914, initial VET schools were opened to supplement the needs of the craft chambers, laying the 
foundation for the contemporary dual education system (Shackleton, 1995). The final piece of 
the apprenticeship system was put in place in 1908 with the creation of the Deutsche Ausschuß 
für Technisches Schulwesen (DATSCH), the association of manufacturing and engineering in-
dustries who developed standardized curriculum and exams for trainees (Busemeyer, 2015). In 
1919, DATSCH publicly emphasized the importance of theoretical, school-based instruction in 
addition to practical, firm-based training (Shackleton, 1995).  
 After the disasters of the second world war, American occupying interests promoted de-
mocratization of Germany’s “elitist” education system, which they believed contributed to the 
rise of Hitler and the Nazis. In an odd coalition of the US Military Government, German Social 
Democrats, and trade unions pitted against Christian Democrats, Gymnasium and University ed-
ucators, and churches, conservative interests prevailed, unlike in Japan, to stave off liberal re-
forms  (Busemeyer, 2015). The result of the post-war Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, 
was increased public expenditure in education, from 15.7 billion Deutsche Marks (DM) in 1965 
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to 44.6 billion DM in 1973. Consequently, the number of higher secondary students rose from 
1,529,000 in 1965 to 2,210,000 in 1975 and the number of university students rose from 308,000 
to 696,000 over the same time period (Shackleton, 1995). With reforms much needed to keep up 
with student growth, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic VET proposals were consid-
ered under the 1966 SPD-CDU grand coalition. Social Democrats wanted integrated comprehen-
sive schools providing theory-based VET, establishment of a publicly controlled training levy 
system to redistribute funds, and expanded legal oversight of firm-based VET. Christian Democ-
rats, conversely, wanted legislation that much closer mirrored the actual compromise, a 1969 
Law on Vocational Education and Training. This legislation did not question the autonomy of 
firms in apprenticeship training, did not create a publicly controlled training fund, and did not 
comprehensively reform legal framework surrounded the dual education system. While the law 
did unify previously disparate legal framework, calls for reform of the reform became louder af-
ter the oil crisis and increasing youth unemployment. With a new government in power, a wa-
tered-down version of the SPD’s 1969 VET reform proposal was passed in 1976, but even that 
legislation was declared unconstitutional in 1980 for not consulting the Länder, or states, in the 
Bundesrat (Busemeyer, 2015). 
 While overarching reforms to the country’s VET system proved to be unsuccessful, mod-
ernizations were possible in the final decades of the 20th century. Between 1970 and 1995, a se-
ries of ordinances revised virtually all occupations requiring vocational training, merging 901 
registered occupations in 1950 to 343 in 2007. These revisions included the addition of new oc-
cupations made possible by technological advances, such as Information Technology (IT), and 
updated teaching methods. Occupations were grouped with similar professions for one year of 
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general training followed by more skill specific training in the following years. For example, 
forty-five metalworking trades were redefined to include six occupations for general training and 
sixteen specialties thereafter from 1977 to 1984 (Bosch, 2010). After the reunification of Ger-
many, large state-owned firms, which had been the center of VET in the GDR, went bankrupt, 
causing the government to heavily subsidize school-based and firm-based VET in East Germany. 
Thought to be a short-term fix, VET in the new Länder has not changed much thus far in the 21st 
century (Busemeyer, 2015). 
 The basis of the German education system is the tripartite school structure that begins 
tracking children at the age of 10 into a lower (Hauptschule), intermediate (Realschule), and up-
per (Gymnasium) lower secondary schools (Bosch, 2010). Making up 22% of lower secondary 
students in 2000, Hauptschule prepares students for workforce training with a classic core cur-
riculum as well as physical education and the arts. Enrolling 25% of lower secondary students in 
2000, Realschule offers more flexibility than Hauptschule, preparing students for technical col-
leges, white-collar apprenticeships, or transfer to Gynasium. Consisting of 23% of lower sec-
ondary students in 2000, Gynasium is the most academically challenging track, getting students 
ready for four-year universities. In recent years, the amount of students tracked into Hauptschule 
has decreased 13% from 35% in 1980 (Clark, 2004), partially resulting from the increasing share 
of immigrant students going this route. Numerous once respected Hauptschules have faced accu-
sations of being ghettos for migrant children, many of whom drop out without vocational creden-
tials, and this public relations crisis has even prompted some to suggest closing down 
Hauptschule altogether. The rationale is related to educational stratification induced inequality, 
which would supposedly be reduced by merging Germany’s three tracks into two. For the time 
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being, this is still an issue decided at the Länder. As for the school leavers, a “transitional sys-
tem” has been put in place that allows young people to complete a year’s worth of coursework 
before being funneled back into the dual education track (Bosch, 2010). 
 Making the jump to upper secondary school, Hauptschule students usually secure an ap-
prenticeship and take their classes at a Berufsschulen, or part-time vocational school. Working 
three to four days a week and taking classes one to two days a week, Berufsschulen students 
spend one-third of their time taking academic courses and two-thirds of their time taking voca-
tion-specific courses (Clark, 2004). The system is employer driven, with about 50% of compa-
nies accepting an apprentice anywhere from two to four years to fulfill a need within the firm. 
When apprentices are not at work, they receive about twelve hours per week of vocational train-
ing from qualified teachers, paid for by the German government (Zimmerman et al., 2013). To 
complete their certification, Berufsschulen  students must pass practical, oral, and written exams 
administered by their employers, union representatives, and teachers. 90% of Berufsschulen stu-
dents are successful by their third try (Clark, 2004), and between 50% and 60% of apprentices 
stay on with their firm after they have passed their exams (Zimmerman et al., 2013). Realschule 
students can embark upon this dual education path right away or enroll in full-time upper sec-
ondary vocational schools, called Berufsfachshule (Clark, 2004). These schools are well funded 
and well respected, though the amount of students choosing this route has dropped some in re-
cent years (Hoeckel and Schwartz, 2010). Berufsfachshule focus on occupations for which ap-
prenticeships are unavailable, such as social work, nursing, and medical technicians. The curricu-
lum lasts from one to four years depending on the student’s occupation, but usually after the sec-
ond year, students begin working in their respective field (Clark, 2004). In sum, 60% of young 
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people in Germany are in engaged with the dual education apprenticeship system at some point 
in their workforce preparation (Siecke, 2012). 
 For those who eschew the dual education system, tertiary education has a vocational 
component in the form of Fachhochschulen, or universities of applied sciences. The natural suc-
cessor to the Berufsfachshule, universities of applied sciences are new to the higher education 
scene, arriving amidst the 1970s education reforms. While they cannot award PhDs or postdoc-
toral Habilitation, the Bologna process is offering them the ability to grant bachelor’s and mas-
ter’s degrees, raising their prestige in German society (Clark, 2004). Should Fachhochschulen 
students wish to transfer to traditional four-year universities, which 65% do, the process has been 
streamlined by Bologna, and it is now easier than ever to do so (Siecke, 2012). The only problem 
with Fachhochschulen is the potential bifurcation of the German economy, as trainees are in-
creasingly grouped into either dual education apprentice or university level bachelor’s degree. 
With a knowledge economy and an education system that has been liberalized in the past decade, 
many economists are concerned about the effects this could have on wage mobility and income 
inequality. Not to mention the 18% of vocation school-based training that will be streamlined to 
Fachhochschulen and university as opposed to the labor market (Bosch, 2010). As the number of 
apprentices has dropped form 650,000 in 1980 to 576,000 in 2006 and the average age of appren-
tices has risen from 16.6 years in 1970 to 19.5 years in 2005, it is becoming clear that more and 
more qualifications are necessary to succeed in the modern German economy (Trappmann, 
2012).  
 In some ways, this conflicts with the objectives of the German VET system, which Sen-
genberger called “socially controlled welfare capitalism” aimed at improving social standards 
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through work (Shackleton, 1995). At the heart of Germany’s socially controlled welfare capital-
ism are the unions, which previously opposed large-scale apprenticeship training but now have 
changed their tune. Coalitions between unions and employers, seen in Germany since the 1990s, 
are the institutional framework for coordinated market economies (Busemeyer, 2015). The 
unions perceive VET to be a social right, much like in statist skill countries, that serve to develop 
skills and enable social integration. The decrease in apprenticeships concerns unions insofar as 
those social rights via marketplace training are being denied to young people, which previous 
generations have used to cultivate skills, build competency, and find meaning in work and life 
(Trappmann, 2012). Apprenticeships are also likely to offer relevant workforce preparation, as 
80% of employees who participated in the dual education system in 2004 were in employed in a 
field related to their training. This figure is higher than Realschule students who were trained in 
Fachhochschulen or Gymnasium students who were university trained (Bosch, 2010). The down-
side to this private firm investment in hyperspecialization of trainees is, of course, that compa-
nies want a return on their investments, meaning that dual education students pursuing advanced, 
higher education would upset the system. In short, these incentives maintain the tripartite status 
quo, reinforcing limited mobility between the tracks determined at a very young age (Busemeyer, 
2015). 
 It is this issue, in particular, that concerns Siecke (2012) regarding educational equality of 
opportunity for low income students. While there are some opportunities for transfer within Re-
alschule, Hauptschule students are more or less selected for VET before teenage years have set 
in. As we have seen in the case of America, however, naive assumptions that college preparatory 
and university education is the right choice for everyone have left more than half the country 
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scrambling to acquire skills, certifications, and semi-skilled jobs into adulthood. Busemeyer 
(2015) also believes that while social trends are moving towards a consolidated education sys-
tem, like Sweden did in the 1960s, a complete abolition of educational stratification is not politi-
cally feasible in the near future. While the unions believe VET is a social right, employers and 
much of the German workforce still sees workforce preparation from a human capital theory per-
spective. Because of these core beliefs and the institutions catering towards a coordinated market 
economy, Germany’s famous dual education apprenticeship system is not likely to be gutted in 
the near future. 
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France 
 By the end of the 19th century, the Republicans had a problem with violence among 
working class youth, specifically boys between thirteen (the end of compulsory schooling) and 
eighteen (the beginning of military service). The solution: the creation of German style technical 
schools and the Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (CAP) for apprentices in 1919. While the 
technical schools were a smashing success, enrolling 100,000 elite, highly skilled workers in the 
early 1940s, very few apprentices took the CAP. Due to the early failure of the CAP, a second 
type of vocational schools, lycées professionnels, were started under the Vichy government. Up 
until the 1960s, French VET was bifurcated between technical school students who would go on 
to careers in middle management and lycées professionnel students who would go on to blue and 
white collar careers. During the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969), compulsory 
schooling was extended to sixteen and technical education was expanded, making up half of all 
lycée pupils in 1970s (Troger, 2002). While this would seem like a good thing at first, with the 
law of 1971 seemingly investing more funds into VET, technical education became second best 
and was actually in worse shape than in the 1950s when a smaller but more selective group of 
working class youth studied to learn a trade (Le Deist and Winterton, 2012).  
 Since the 1980s, the goal of French governments has been to send 80% of each age co-
hort to the baccalauréat level, including the baccalauréat professionnel. Started in 1985 to lessen 
the inequality between academic and vocational studies, these vocational high schools grant stu-
dents learning manual trades access to higher education. Today, they represent 15% of baccalau-
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réats awarded. The French government’s commitment to apprenticeship training has been less 
steadfast, however, as apprenticeship registration has oscillated from a high point of 400,000 in 
the 1960s to a low point of 150,000 in the 1970s back up to 350,000 more recently (Méhaut, 
2010). Private companies have wavered in their support too, backing employee training with 
2.34% of their wages in 1986, above the required 1.2% and higher than their contributions in the 
1970s (Shackleton, 1995). The National Agreement of 2003 has been the most significant recent 
legislation on French VET, broadening the notion of training and creating a new individual train-
ing right (DIF). Through the DIF, employees are granted the right to twenty hours of training per 
year and an appraisal interview every two years to assess training needs (Le Deist and Winterton, 
2012). The National Agreement also provides at-risk employees with educational and training 
passports, which offer re-skilling contracts to update and modernize their skills. This is a process 
of “lifelong vocational training” that is a cornerstone of statist skill VET systems like France 
(Méhaut, 2010). 
 All French students are compelled to complete a basic education from age six to sixteen, 
after which they are free to make choices about their education and career.  Students progress 
from école primaire (primary school) to collège (lower secondary school) to lycée (upper sec-
ondary school). Vocational lycées are available via the baccalauréat professionnel and baccalau-
réat technologique. Comprising 15% of students in 1991, the baccalauréat professionnel lasts 
only two years and covers a mixture of academic and vocational education, including the usual 
academic subjects such as French, history, and foreign language as well as twenty-six diverse 
vocational subjects such as motor vehicle engineering, clothing administration, and catering. 
Over 80% of students receiving the baccalauréat professionnel go straight into the workforce, 
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forgoing higher education to take the CAP or the more general and somewhat more rigorous 
brevet d'études professionnelles (BEP). Comprising 28% of baccalauréat seekers in 1991 (Shack-
leton, 1995), the baccalauréat technologique prepares students for technical higher education at a 
Brevet de Technicien Supérieur (BTS), Diplôme Universitaire de Technologie (DUT), or Institut 
Universitaire Professionnalisé (IUP) (Brandt, 2015). The remaining 57% of lycée students in 
1991 took the general baccalauréat (Shackleton, 1995), and compared to vocational lycée stu-
dents, these students tend to be wealthier and more academically inclined. In fact, over 80% of 
vocational lycée students were at least one year behind in school at age twelve (Brandt, 2015). 
 If baccalauréat professionnel students do not find themselves among the 11% of dropouts 
in 2009, down from 15% in 1998, they can take the CAP, which has almost no value after the 
2003 reforms, or the BEP that offers young people proficiency in over 31 occupational areas 
(Méhaut, 2012). Baccalauréat technologique students often enroll in a technical university, deliv-
ering two or three year curriculums taught by industry professionals, who make up half the staff 
compared to professional educators. Students should be mindful, however, that higher education 
dropout rates in France are high, up to 50% in some institutions, although slightly less in 
Diplôme d'Études Universitaires Générales and even less in the prestigious Grandes Écoles. If 
students fail to complete university but are interested in acquiring further vocational credentials, 
they may attend one of 350 Groupements d’Établissements (GRETAs) or Centres de Formation 
des Apprentis (CFAs) for part or full time vocational training and optional apprenticeships 
(Shackleton, 1995). As of 2010, the unemployment rates for each level of education broke down 
as follows: No Baccalauréat: 48%, General Baccalauréat: 21%, Voational Baccalauréat: 20%, 
Technical University: 15%, General University or Grandes École: 9% (Brandt, 2015). As this 
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data demonstrates, France is a highly qualification centric society, with education levels ranging 
from I to VI, but German style apprenticeship programs have shown some ability to cut through 
the red tape and connect young people to the labor market.  
 In the past, apprenticeships had a negative public image, certainly more so than school-
based vocational training. Pass rates were low and labor market success even lower, but this be-
gan to change in the 1990s. With the advent of the baccalauréat professionnel, apprentices were 
bringing more qualifications than simply the CAP to CFAs (Méhaut, 2010). The situation has 
completely reversed today, and apprentices now fare better in the job market than school-based 
vocational students. Over the 2001-2007 period, 50% of dual education students were hired 
compared to 30% of traditional vocational students. Furthermore, apprentices have a 6.5% higher 
chance of being salaried employees and earn 3% higher salaries than similarly qualified voca-
tional students three years after graduation. Companies prefer the practical skills, Brandt (2015) 
postulates, and apprentices establish more effective professional networks through the work-
place. Although the success of recent apprentices is measurable, only 33% of French vocational 
students enrolled in this model, demonstrating the statist skill VET system’s resistance to change. 
In fact, the many countries that have attempted to export the German dual education model have 
found this system’s success is dependent upon firm, union, and government cooperation, which 
can take years to institutionally implement. Still, some reform is better than none, especially re-
forms that challenge the stated objectives of the statist skill VET model itself. 
 In France, compulsory education and initial vocational training are regarded as public 
goods, even social rights, to be charged to society via taxes and levies. The system is very broad 
and has done well to ensure graduates enter the labor market with formal qualifications. Since 
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employers are only given limited say in compulsory education and initial vocational training, 
however, students’ skillsets are not always aligned with the economy’s needs (Shackleton, 1995). 
The other problem is that of prestige, an important part of French education. From Grandes 
Écoles to the Civil Service, France is a country that values formal educational achievement. Be-
cause vocational education, and by extension the trades themselves, has been devalued in French 
society, students often undertake these studies out of failure. Consequently, the quality of student 
and employee representing VET has caused somewhat of a public relations crisis, which hit a 
fever point in the early 1980s but has since been assuaged with the return of an apprenticeship 
system bolstered by baccalauréat qualifications (Méhaut, 2010). This is not to say that all statist 
skill VET systems are failures, on the contrary, but public commitment to VET is necessary for 
success. France’s history rooted in enlightenment ideas that have spurred many a revolution also 
contribute to its commitment to an academic public education system. Qualifications, granted by 
the system, signal to employers what students have achieved throughout their youth, which allow 
them to make informed hiring decisions. 
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Comparative Analysis 
 With a sufficient understanding of each cluster’s VET system attained through represen-
tative case studies, it is time to evaluate the dual hypotheses. Using Busemeyer’s framework, I 
hypothesized that high levels of commodification and high levels of educational stratification, 
rooted in human capital theory and pushed by Christian Democratic right wing parties, leads to 
low levels of youth unemployment. I also hypothesized that low levels of commodification and 
low levels of educational stratification, rooted in education as a social right and pushed by Social 
Democratic left wing parties, leads to low levels of income inequality. Both hypotheses assume 
high public commitment to VET, a variable that has been shown to benefit those at the bottom 
half of the skills distribution more than high public commitment to higher education. Because 
educational choices largely determined by social background, with children from parents with 
nonacademic backgrounds unlikely to pursue higher education, public commitment to VET acts 
as a “safety net” for this demographic, boosting skills and labor market outcomes. Furthermore, 
research has demonstrated that these choices are “persistent” over many decades despite numer-
ous interventions to increase educational attainment (Busemeyer, 2015). 
 Of the three country clusters, Germany (medium commodification, high educational strat-
ification) is the closest to my hypothesized VET system (high commodification, high educational 
stratification) that would lower youth unemployment, followed by the USA (high commodifica-
tion, low educational stratification) then France (low commodification, low educational stratifi-
cation). Zimmerman et al. (2013) found that the German dual education apprenticeship model of 
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VET facilitated a smoother transition to work, had lower NEET rates, and posted lower youth 
unemployment numbers than the other three models studied. This finding was built upon a large 
body of literature, such as Hoeckel and Schwartz (2010), that showed dual education apprentice-
ships improve the skills of young people and help them transition into more regulated labor mar-
kets by lowering labor costs and increasing training commitments form employers. For more lib-
eral labor markets, transition is highly individualistic for young people who use first jobs as 
stepping stones for a career. The volatile nature of this school-to-work model works for some but 
fails others, leaving its youth unemployment somewhere in the middle of developed nations.  
 Busemeyer (2015, p198) demonstrated via a bivariate scatterplot that there is a strong 
negative association between workplace-based VET and youth unemployment, more so than 
simply upper secondary school students in VET and youth unemployment. Moreover, an increase 
in the share of apprenticeship training by 45% is predicted to be associated with a decrease in 
youth unemployment by 8%. According to the OECD (2016), Germany, who trains 50% of 
young people in the dual education system annually, boasted a youth unemployment rate of 
7.0%, the USA, where 5% of youths have apprenticeships, had a youth unemployment rate of 
10.4%, and France, with 15% of young people participating in apprenticeships, posted a youth 
unemployment rate of 24.6%. In this case, a best-fit line can be drawn from France to Germany, 
with the USA as an outlier due to its high levels of commodification. The share of youth in the 
dual education system represents levels of educational stratification, and the extent to which the 
private sector pays represents commodification. Due to the strong nature of the association be-
tween workplace-based VET and youth unemployment, and the fact that country clusters utiliz-
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ing them have had high shares of Christian Democratic governments over the past half century, 
the first part of my hypothesis has been confirmed. 
 The second half of my hypothesis centers around the extent to which low commodifica-
tion and low educational stratification VET systems, à la France, cause low levels of income in-
equality. After France, the United States (high commodification, low educational stratification) 
and Germany (medium commodification, high educational stratification) are equally far away 
from France on the Busemeyer graph. In this case, low commodification means the state pays for 
the majority of education related expenses as opposed to the private individual or firm and low 
stratification means VET is school-based, infused into the general curricula, as opposed to work-
based. Kuckulenz (2007) found school-based, generalized VET has a stronger earning potential 
for students than firm-based, specific VET. Busemeyer confirmed this finding through a bivariate 
scatterplot showing a negative association, although very weak, between educational stratifica-
tion and income inequality. According to the OECD (2015), the most highly stratified education-
al system, Germany, had a gini coefficient of 0.289 while the two less educationally stratified 
countries, the USA and France, had gini coefficients of 0.390 and 0.297 respectively.  
 Based on these three data points alone, it would appear there is no association at all, or 
even a positive one, between educational stratification and income inequality. Several mitigating 
factors, however, play a role in these scattered findings. First, the USA and France, while both 
featuring low levels of educational stratification, have vastly different levels of commodification, 
the main factor that separates the two gini coefficients. Next, Germany and France have different 
levels of public commitment to VET, so while Germany actually has less income inequality than 
France, it doesn’t follow that this is because it has more educational stratification. It could very 
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easily be that Germany has less income inequality than France because it has more public com-
mitment to VET than France. Among other statist skill, low commodification and low education-
al stratification countries with strong public commitment to school-based VET like Sweden, Fin-
land, and Denmark, the OECD (2015) shows each of these three Nordic countries have lower 
gini coefficients than Germany, at 0.274, 0.260, and 0.256 respectively. In the case studies I have 
outlined with the USA, Germany, and France, my second hypothesis has not been true, but over-
all among all liberal skill, collective skill, and statist skill countries, my second hypothesis is par-
tially true, depending on the level of public commitment to VET. 
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Conclusion 
 Discerning which system of VET best prepares students for work has not been a simple 
task. First, I had to identify a framework upon which I could typify various VET systems. Next, I 
had to choose key labor market indicators that could best qualify which type of VET best pre-
pared students for work. After that, I hypothesized the relationship between factors upon which 
types of VET varied and the two key labor market indicators I chose to measure VET, which then 
led me to outlining three case studies of sample countries from each VET cluster. Finally, I eval-
uated my hypotheses with these case studies in mind, leaving me to wrestle with various conclu-
sions. The most important is that public commitment to VET matters, perhaps as much or more 
than commodification and educational stratification. Many countries have tried to take on Ger-
man style apprenticeships in recent years, but only other countries where German is spoken like 
Austria and Switzerland have been successful. This is, of course, because Austria and Switzer-
land have a long history with dual education, and its fabrics are woken into each country’s coor-
dinated market economy. Liberal skill countries like the United States and statist skill countries 
like France have been less successful in establishing apprenticeships, although those who have 
participated, 5% and 15% of young people respectively, have benefited. 
 While perhaps less important than public commitment to VET, educational stratification 
plays a large role in reducing youth unemployment. Employers are interested in hiring young 
people with relevant skills, so who better to train them than employers themselves? The down-
side of this system is that since employers are paying to train their employees, they have an in-
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centive to keep their employees from pursuing higher education, which has been shown to in-
crease earnings potential and labor market mobility. Many of these students, as Busemeyer has 
shown, would not be attending higher education anyway, so initial VET investment has enor-
mous returns for the economy but also for each young person who can experience the dignity of 
work. Speaking of which, commodification is an important variable in determining who pays for 
workforce training. In medium commodified, collective skill country clusters like Germany, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland, private firms are shouldering most of the cost of training, which benefits 
everyone. Liberal skill, highly commodified country clusters, however, push the cost of educa-
tion onto the individual, and oftentimes the state via federal student loans, which enriches those 
who can afford to pay for elite degrees with prestige. For many lower and middle class students, 
unfortunately, highly commodified education systems mean opting out of the system or being 
saddled with high amounts of student debt in a stage of life when one would like to take risks 
like starting a business, getting married, or buying a home. The purpose of VET is to avoid this 
trap, arming students of all races, classes, and genders with the skills they need to pursue the ca-
reers they want with tuitions they can afford. Once this criteria has been met, we can all say to-
gether, “let’s get to work!” 
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